Monthly Archives: April 2009

Great moment in legal writing

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Filed under News

As many of you have heard, the Supreme Court of Iowa held today that the Iowa marriage statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution.   I thought I’d pause from discussing copyright for a moment to acknowledge the opinion’s factual writeup.   The use of the numbers twelve, six and one; contrasting long and short sentences; most Iowans, many Iowans, and all Iowans . . . elegant.  I have to place this among my favorite factual passages:

This lawsuit is a civil rights action by twelve individuals who reside in six communities across Iowa. Like most Iowans, they are responsible, caring, and productive individuals. They maintain important jobs, or are retired, and are contributing, benevolent members of their communities. They include a nurse, business manager, insurance analyst, bank agent, stay-at-home parent, church organist and piano teacher, museum director, federal employee, social worker, teacher, and two retired teachers. Like many Iowans, some have children and others hope to have children. Some are foster parents. Like all Iowans, they prize their liberties and live within the borders of this state with the expectation that their rights will be maintained and protected—a belief embraced by our state motto.

Despite the commonality shared with other Iowans, the twelve plaintiffs are different from most in one way. They are sexually and romantically attracted to members of their own sex. The twelve plaintiffs comprise six same-sex couples who live in committed relationships. Each maintains a hope of getting married one day, an aspiration shared by many throughout Iowa.

copyright litigation attorneys

Spanish yellow pages publisher denied ex-parte TRO; no mention of Winter v. National Resources Defense Council

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Filed under Preliminary Injunction

Momento, Inc. v. Seccion Amarilla USA, 2009 WL 799405 (N.D. Cal. 2009)

There was a decision in the Northern District of California on March 24 that shows how some district courts are either electing not to apply Winter v. National Resources Defense Council in copyright actions, or are just seeking to avoid reversible error in situations where it’s not necessary.

Momento published Spanish-language yellow pages in Northern California.  The company created some of its own advertisements by preparing and translating text, designing layouts and taking photographs. Momento alleged that Seccion Amarilla, a rival Spanish-language phone book publisher, infringed its advertisements.

Memento filed a complaint seeking an ex-parte temporary restraining order.  Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong of the Northern District of California denied the motion, but set an expedited briefing schedule for a temporary restraining order, giving Seccion a day to respond after service.

Legal Standard for a TRO

Judge Armstrong set forth the standard for issuing an ex-parte TRO as follows:

The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

Denial

The Court rejected the TRO for two reasons.  First, Judge Armstrong found that Memento had failed to allege that Seccion had a history of disposing of evidence or violating court orders:

[P]laintiffs must show that defendants would have disregarded a direct court order and disposed of the goods within the time it would take for a hearing … [and] must support such assertions by showing that the adverse party has a history of disposing of evidence or violating court orders or that persons similar to the adverse party have such a history. . .  In an action for copyright infringement, irreparable harm may be presumed upon a copyright owner’s demonstration that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its copyright infringement claim. Here, even if Momento were to demonstrate both success on the merits and irreparable harm, it fails to demonstrate the immediacy of any such harm.

Secondly, the Court found that Momento had failed to explain the efforts it made to give notice and, why it shouldn’t be required.

Winter v. National Resources Defense Council

Judge Armstrong’s decision is somewhat interesting given that she didn’t address the June 2008 Supreme Court opinion in Winter v. National Resources Defense Council.  Some district courts have read the recent opinion as eliminating the practice of granting a plaintiff in a copyright action moving for preliminary injunctive relief a presumption of irreparable harm, upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. See, e.g. Inspection Management Systems, Inc. v. Open Door Inspections, Inc., 2009 WL 805813 (E.D.Cal. 2009); Jacobsen v. Katzer et al, 2009 WL 29881 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Scentsy, Inc. v. Performance Mfg., Inc., 2009 WL 320334(D.Idaho 2009).

publishing law attorneys

What constitutes a fatal error on a notice of intention to use a compulsory license?

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Filed under Compulsory License, Mechanical royalties

EMI Entertainment World, Inc. v. Karen Records, Inc., 2009 WL 805264 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

Judge Richard J. Holwell of the Southern District of New York issued an order this past Friday that addressed what is a fatal mistake on a notice to use a composition under the 17 U.S.C. § 115(b) compulsory license provision.  The bottom line?  Don’t send a permissions request if you’re actually sending a notice.

Karen Records, a Latin recording label, attempted to give notice that it planned to use four different EMI songs under Section 115(b).  After a series of disputes concerning unpaid royalties, EMI brought suit for copyright infringement, alleging, among other things, that Karen’s notice filings were invalid.

Nonfatal errors

Karen’s attempted notice for three songs featured:

  • Karen’s name and contact information
  • the names and authors of the compositions for which Karen sought licenses
  • the publishers that owned the rights to the compositions
  • the album the songs would be included on
  • the notation “Please issue and release license from 7/6/99”

Judge Holwell found that while Karen’s letter didn’t fulfil all of the requirements set forth in 37 C.F.R. 201.18, the errors weren’t fatal:

True, Karen’s form requests did not comply with § 201.18′s requirements to the letter. They were not, for example, signed by “a duly authorized officer or agent of the corporation,” § 201.18(e)(1), nor were they entitled “Notice of Intention to Obtain a Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords,” § 201.18(d). But as already noted, such errors are not fatal to a notice unless they “materially affect[ed] the adequacy of the information required to serve the purposes of [17 U.S.C. § 115(b) ].” 37 C.F.R. § 201.18(g). Karen’s notices clearly indicated its intent to acquire mechanical licenses to EMI’s works, specifically identified the compositions it sought licenses for (as well as the albums those compositions would appear on), and identified Karen with enough specificity for EMI to easily enforce its rights (witness this suit). The purposes of § 115(b) were served.

Fatal errors

A forth song was requested using a letter that was different than the previous notice in three respects:

  • the letter was titled “Request for Mechanical License”
  • the request contained a line for “publisher[']s approval” that Harry Fox never countersigned
  • the form didn’t contain the “Please issue and release …” language

Judge Holwell found that the notice was defective and no compulsory license was granted:

The Court next turns to La Colegiala. The form Karen faxed to Harry Fox for this song differed in important ways from the forms it sent to Harry Fox for Cuando Acaba el Placer, Corazón Partío, and Fuiste Mia un Verano. Unlike the earlier forms, the La Colegiala form explicitly requested a license. Furthermore, it did not contain the earlier forms’ “Please issue and release …” language, and thus never expressed a clear intent to make use of La Colegiala. The Court concludes that as a result of these differences, Karen never acquired a license for this composition.

music attorneys