Copyright Law Blog: Exclusive Rights

Monthly Archives: June 2009

Reasons Affecting Frequency of File-Sharing among Finnish Internet Users

Shourin Sen - 30 June 2009 – 9:15 am

Filed under Academia

Ever wonder how socio-demographic variables, moral condemnation and legal knowledge correlate with the likelihood that a person is an active P2P user in Finland? Professors Herkko A. Hietanen, of the Helsinki Institute for Information Technology, and Pekka Räsänen, of the University of Turku, have posted an interesting study at SSRN that uses main-effect logistic regression models to answer just this question:

The article examines file-sharing behavior on illegal file-sharing services. We build on an Internet survey (N=6,083) we conducted to Finnish users in 2007. Using the survey data we examine how the respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics associate the file-sharing. We also examine whether knowledge of law has any impact on file-sharing behavior. We find that the frequent and the infrequent P2P-users share several common attributes with each other. Frequent users are clearly more often male than female, are younger, and possess lower educational qualifications than infrequent users. The results also indicate that the people who are active in P2P-users have weaker legal knowledge about digital copyright issues. The findings and the use of the survey method carry implications for legal and social science scholar work that examines the illegal file-sharing phenomenon.

Supreme Court docket roundup of copyright cases

Shourin Sen - 30 June 2009 – 9:00 am

Filed under Supreme Court

There was quite a bit of movement over the past few weeks on many of the Supreme Court cases that we’ve discussed. I thought it was time for a quick update.

Cable News Network, Inc., et al. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., et al.

The Supreme Court denied cert yesterday following on the heels of the Department of Justice’s brief arguing that the case wasn’t a suitable vehicle for review.

Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick

I’ve completed the document collection thanks to the ABA, which hosts merits and amicus briefs for all pending Supreme Court cases. The new documents are:

Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega, S.A

There were a series of amicus briefs filed in Costco before the deadline, none of which were from organized labor. So, it shows you what I know. The briefs are courtesy of Public Knowledge.

Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP, Petitioners v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al.

Petitioner’s brief is due on July, 27 2009. Anyone who is following the Appointments Clause challenge to the Copyright Royalty Board, or considering potential ramifications for a challenge to the Register of Copyrights should be anxiously awaiting the filing from the Solicitor General. The DOJ has a tough sell in Free Enterprise Fund, given that the appointments at issue were made by a group of people, instead of an individual. At the same time, the case will likely establish a new standard of review for Appointments Clause challenges. It’ll be interesting to see what standard the DOJ suggests, both for the case at bar, and future Appointments Clause challenges.

On whether a work merits copyright protection is a question of law or fact

Shourin Sen - 29 June 2009 – 9:00 am

Filed under Originality, Useful Article

Jonathan Browning, Inc. v. Venetian Casino Resort LLC, 2009 WL 1764652 (N.D. Cal. 2009)

There was an interesting decision last week in the Northern District of California over the question of whether a work warrants copyright protection is of one of law, appropriate for a judge, or fact, appropriate for a jury. The Plaintiff brought suit for among other things infringement of its copyrights in two lighting fixtures. The Defendant challenged whether the works merited protection. An examiner at the Copyright Office had rejected registration of the fixtures finding that they were “‘useful articles’ which do not contain any separable features that are copyrightable.” Post rejection, the Plaintiff submitted hand drawings of the light fixtures to the Copyright Office that were registered.

At issue on this motion was a request by the Plaintiff to strike an expert report and to preclude the Defendants from offering the expert’s testimony in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or at trial. The Plaintiff objected to the testimony on the grounds that the expert was set to speak about a pure issue of law, whether a work merits copyright protection. As a pure question of law, the Plaintiff argued, the issue must be reserved for the judge to decide as a matter of law, sans expert testimony. (The Defendant, perhaps as a tactical decision, elected not to challenge the characterization of the issue as a question of law.)

The Court agreed that the question of whether a work is copyrightable is a question of law, citing Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 932 F.Supp. 220, 225 (N.D.Ill.1996) (holding that there is no need for expert testimony on the subject of what constitutes copyrightable subject matter as the issue is determined by the judge, not the jury). The Court excluded the expert testimony in regards to the whether specific light fixtures at issue warranted copyright protection, but allowed the expert’s testimony on the general practices of the Copyright Office and history of design protection:

The subjects of Mr. Oman’s testimony, as represented in his report, are: (1) the practices and procedures of the Copyright Office; (2) the history of design protection in the United States; and (3) the decisions of the Copyright Office as to the light fixtures at issue here. To the extent Mr. Oman wishes to testify generally about the practices and procedures of the U.S. Copyright Office regarding the registration of useful articles, or the procedures for special handling requests, or the history of design protection in the United States, Mr. Oman is entitled to so testify. However, to the extent Mr. Oman is proffered to testify about the copyrightability of the specific light fixtures in this matter or the particular decision on those fixtures, that testimony does indeed pertain to an ultimate issue of law to be decided by the Court, and not by the jury.

Notes:

Patry on Copyright takes the position that the question of whether a work is a useful article, that doesn’t contain independent features that merit copyright protection, is a question of fact that may be resolved by a jury with expert testimony. Citation to Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984); Kikker 5150 v. Kikker 5150 USA, LLC, 2004 WL 1837926 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Patry at 3:147. More generally, the Treatise states that the “vast majority” of courts have held that “creativity is a question of fact.” Patry at 3:39.

Arbitration clauses and a jurisdictional Catch-22

Shourin Sen - 28 June 2009 – 12:54 pm

Filed under News

Software for Moving, Inc. v. La Rosa Del Monte Exp., Inc., 2009 WL 1788054 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

There was a decision last week in the S.D.N.Y. that is candy for any of you who, like me, love the sometimes bizarre world of subject matter jurisdiction. In Software for Moving, Inc. v. La Rosa Del Monte Exp., Inc., the Defendant moving company refused to make payments to a vendor of a web-based moving software, allegedly because the vendor was behind schedule. The Defendant brought an arbitration proceeding under an arbitration clause in its licensing agreement. The Plaintiff vendor filed an action in the Northern District of Illinois alleging, among other things, copyright infringement. The moving company filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, a transfer to the Southern District of New York.

Eden Toys and subject matter jurisdiction in the Northern District of Illinois

There is a peculiar, but generally accepted, judicially created exception to 17 U.S.C. 204(a)’s requirement that an assignment of exclusive rights must be in writing. The exception, which was first enunciated in Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment, Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1983), bars a third-party from contesting the validity of a transfer when the copyright owner and the transferee don’t dispute the transfer. Under this exception, the Defendant moving company wasn’t allowed to challenge the Plaintiff’s copyright ownership:

Judge Gottschall relied upon established case law in the Seventh Circuit that “[w]here there is no dispute between the copyright owner and the transferee over the status of the copyright, ‘it would be unusual and unwarranted to allow a third party infringer to invoke [17 U.S.C. § ] 204(a) to avoid suit for copyright infringement.’ “ Software for Moving, Inc. v. La Rosa Del Monte Express, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 1839, 2007 WL 4365363, at *3 (N.D.Ill.Dec. 7, 2007) (quoting Billy-Bob Teeth, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 329 F.3d 586, 592-93 (7th Cir.2003)).

Judge Gottschall of the Northern District of Illinois found the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the suit and transferred the case to the Southern District of New York.

Proceedings in the Southern District of New York

In the Southern District of New York the Plaintiff claimed that the licensing agreement was a forgery and not binding on the dispute. The Court held a non-jury trial, heard five witnesses, and reached the conclusion of fact that the agreement was valid, including the arbitration clause which stated (emphasis mine):

Except as specifically provided in this Agreement, the parties agree that any dispute or controversy arising out of, relating to or in connection with the interpretation, validity, construction, performance, breach or termination of this Agreement shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be held in Westchester County, New York in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.

The Court also rejected the Defendant’s renewed claim that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that it should generally provide deference to earlier decisions in a case, and that the Second Circuit recognizes the Eden Toys exception to Copyright Act’s requirement of a written assignment. The Court further found that the question was moot because it had decided in the Defendant’s favor that the licensing agreement was binding, and it ordered arbitration.

So where’s the Catch-22?

The problem with this case is that the question of subject matter jurisdiction is never moot. The issue of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction “is inflexible and without exception, which requires this court, of its own motion, to deny its jurisdiction . . . in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record.” Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan,111 U. S. 379, 382 (1884). The S.D.N.Y. issued a final judgment in Software for Moving, Inc. v. La Rosa Del Monte Exp., Inc. finding that the parties were bound by the arbitration clause. But when the Court issued the judgment, the question of whether the tribunal had subject matter jurisdiction was still up in the air.

Under the facts presented, the Court only had subject matter jurisdiction over the copyright claim and the suit in general if it were to find that there was a termination of the licensing agreement — that there was a claim for copyright infringement, not of contract. Thus we can’t be certain the Court had subject matter jurisdiction unless it delved further into the merits of the case, and decided whether there was a termination of the licensing agreement. According to the arbitration clause, the question of whether there was termination was supposed to be reserved for arbitration.

So does the Court have power to issue a final judgment on the grounds that it might have subject matter jurisdiction? Or is required to address the merits of the case because the merits are intertwined with the question of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction?

This Catch-22 doesn’t go away if you switched the parties in the case and made the plaintiff the defendant, and the defendant the plaintiff. The Federal Arbitration Act doesn’t create an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, tribunals “look through” an arbitration petition and order arbitration if, “‘[s]ave for the arbitration agreement,’ the Court would have jurisdiction the ‘substantive [controversy] between the parties.” Vaden v. Discovery Bank, 556 U.S. __ (2009). Regardless of whether the motion to compel arbitration is a complaint or a counter-claim the Court isn’t certain it has jurisdiction until it addresses many of the merits of the case. This issue also wouldn’t be resolved if plaintiff seeking to compel arbitration were to file in state court. Federal district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over copyright claims.

So, can a tribunal issue a judgment when it may, but doesn’t necessarily, have subject matter jurisdiction? Is it possible to square the judgment in Software Movers, Inc. with the language in Mansfeld that a Court must “deny its jurisdiction . . . in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record”? And if it isn’t possible, are all arbitration clauses that compel arbitration over whether there was a termination of an agreement all but worthless.

Right of publicity claim not preempted for photographs derived from video

Shourin Sen - 26 June 2009 – 3:07 am

Filed under News

Vogel v. Bennett, 2009 WL 1678100 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2009) (unpublished)

The plaintiff was a model and spokesperson in a series of videos that featured bikini-clad women in exotic locales. The Defendants produced, marketed and distributed the films. The Plaintiff alleged that her right of privacy was violated when the Defendants used her likeness in advertising and by selling her image as a wallpaper image for cellular phones. The Plaintiff, however, didn’t claim that the defendants had misappropriated her name or likeness by distributing the videos. (I’m not sure why?)

Patry on Copyright, which has a absolutely superb section on preemption, depicts the standard as follows: “Where the claim is in the performer’s identity as embodied in a work of authorship (e.g. a voice in a recording) under facts where the complaint is over an unauthorized reproduction of an authorized fixation, the claim is preempted: the right asserted is not equivalent to, it is the right to reproduce the work in copies granted in Section 106(1).” See Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006).

The California Court of Appeals for the Second District reached the correct decision in Vogel, and found that the claim wasn’t preempted, but not until after an exhaustive analysis that touched on issues it didn’t need to address, and after it reached decisions that are hard to square with the Copyright Act. The Court found that the Plaintiff’s fixation in the photographs and advertisements — and the films though the plaintiff didn’t contest this — wasn’t authorized because the Plaintiff only consented to the fixation provided a number conditions were met: final editorial approval over contents; plaintiff’s use of the footage; and a “mutual agreement granting plaintiff’s corporations joint ownership and control of the production, marketing, distribution and sale of the videos.” This could have, and should have, been the end of the Court’s analysis. If the fixation wasn’t authorized, there was no need to explore preemption.

Instead, the Court delved into an exhaustive analysis of the use of the work in an attempt to distinguish Fleet v. CBS, 50 Cal.App.4th 1911, a case where a group of actors who weren’t paid brought a right of publicity claim against a studio for distributing a film in which they starred. The easiest way to have distinguished the case at bar from Fleet would be that in Fleet, the actors authorized their fixation, whereas in Vogel, the actor didn’t.

The Court ostensibly distinguished Fleet on the grounds that the case only involved the reproduction of a film, and not photographs that were derivative works from the film. I’m not sure you can square this with the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. 106 grants copyright owners the exclusive right to make derivative works, in addition to the right to make reproductions.

Brazil, Paraguay & Ecuador’s proposed treaty for access to works for the visually impaired

Shourin Sen - 25 June 2009 – 9:00 am

Filed under WIPO

Late last month, the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR), WIPO’s “top copyright negotiating forum,” agreed to continue working towards an international treaty that would facilitate access to works for the visually impaired and reading-disabled. After the forum, the United States and other Group B nations garnered controversy for reportedly seeking to block further negotiations.

I thought it’d be worthwhile to spend a day examining the treaty proposal submitted by Brazil, Paraguay and Ecuador. The proposal is aggressive, requiring that signatories implement compulsory licensing regimes and that WIPO play an active role as a centralized record keeper.

The basics

The proposal suggests mandating an exception from liability for copyright infringement for people to make an accessible format of a work or database and distribute it to the visually impaired. The treaty would deny content owners the ability to contract around the right or prohibit circumvention of DRM. The proposal also would allow works for the visually impaired to be imported and exported without constraints.

The exception would only be available for works that aren’t “reasonably available” in a format enabling access for the visually impaired. In addition, for signatories with developed economies, the exception would apply unless the accessible versions were available at a similar or lower price than the price the works are regularly sold at. For signatories with developing economies, the exception would apply unless accessible versions of the works are “affordable, taking into account disparities of incomes for persons who are visually impaired.”

A continued role for WIPO?

The treaty would require that “reasonable efforts” be made to provide notice to copyright owners if a person elected to reproduce or distribute the work for the visually impaired. The notice would include information regarding the right of copyright owners to obtain remuneration for the use, or to challenge the use on the grounds that it isn’t sufficiently restricted to persons who are visually impaired, or that the work is already available in a format for the visually impaired.

WIPO would be entrusted to create an internet accessible database that would allow copyright owners to identify works for purposes of facilitating notice, and to provide information regarding the availability of works in formats for the visually impaired.

Compulsory license

The treaty would ask contracting nations to establish a mechanism for determining adequate compensation for copyright owners, apparently some sort of compulsory license. The system would grant rights holders remuneration that is “reasonable for normal commercial licensing of works,” taking into account the country, population and purposes of the use. The proposal specified that in developing countries, the rates would take into account disparities of incomes for persons who are visually impaired. The agreement would also carve out exceptions from payment for certain formats, such as Braile, and “certain qualified entities.”

Conference of parties

The proposed treaty would create a Conference of Parties that would meet every five years, and in extraordinary session if agreed upon by a quarter of the contracting parties. The Conference would be designated to develop measures to further the implementation and objectives of the treaty.

Conley & Yoo: Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination in Copyright Economics

Shourin Sen - 24 June 2009 – 9:00 am

Filed under Academia

John P. Conley, a professor of economics at Vanderbilt University, and Christopher S. Yoo, a professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania, have released a new paper on SSRN titled “Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination In Copyright Economics.” The article further explores some of the ideas first addressed in Professor Yoo’s 2008 paper “Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation.” The abstract:

The literature on the economics of copyright proceeds from the premise that copyrightable works constitute pure public goods, which is generally modeled by assuming that such works are nonexcludable and that the marginal cost of making additional copies is essentially zero. A close examination of the foundational literature on public goods theory reveals that the defining characteristic of public goods is instead the optimality criterion known as the “Samuelson condition,” which implies that the systematic bias toward underproduction is the result of the inability to induce consumers to reveal their preferences rather than the inability to exclude or price at marginal cost. Reframing the analysis in terms of the Samuelson condition also contradicts the hostility toward price discrimination reflected in much of the literature by implying that price discrimination is a necessary condition for optimality. At the same time, it implies that the producer need only appropriate the marginal benefits created by the public good, which in turn provides a basis for determining an optimal level of price discrimination that still permits consumers to retain some of the surplus. Moreover, broadening public good models to reflect the fact that copyrighted works often serve as imperfect substitutes for one another allows the number of works to be determined endogenously. In such impure public goods models, the systematic bias toward underproduction disappears, and price discrimination once again may (but need not necessarily) promote optimality.

Court finds it has jurisdiction to hear counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement after granting plaintiff’s request for dismissal of copyright claim

Shourin Sen - 23 June 2009 – 9:00 am

Filed under Jurisdiction

Optimal Markets, Inc. v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 2009 WL 1704665 (N.D. Cal. 2009)

There was a fun civil procedure issue addressed in the Northern District of California last Wednesday. The Plaintiff provided software for electronic auctions. The Defendants were two of the Plaintiff’s former employees who were employed by a rival company at the time of the suit. The Plaintiff brought a claim for, among other things, copyright infringement. The Defendants filed counterclaims including one for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement.

The Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss its copyright claim, and argued that the dismissal would result in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the rest of its claims were based on state law. Thus, the Plaintiff moved for dismissal of the case with the intention of refiling in state court.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides that “[i]f a defendant has pleaded a counterclaim before being served with the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the action may be dismissed over the defendant’s objection only if the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication.”

The Plaintiff first asked the Court to dismiss its claim for copyright infringement without prejudice. After the Defendants argued that the Court would still have federal jurisdiction under their counterclaims for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, the Plaintiff expressed a willingness to dismiss the claim with prejudice on the condition that it wasn’t considered an adjudication on the merits. In the alternative, the Plaintiff asked the Court to dismiss the claim without prejudice but stated that it would be willing to covenant not to sue on the copyright claim.

The Court rejected these two suggestions, noting that a dismissal with prejudice is “tantamount to a judgment on the merits,” Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, 108 F.3d 205, 207 (9th Cir.1997), and that even if Plaintiff’s covenant not to sue on the copyright claim eliminated the copyright controversy between the parties, the Court still had jurisdiction over Defendants’ counterclaims because they were compulsory; the counterclaims were derived from the same common nucleus of operative facts and remained pending, with or without the Plaintiff’s infringement claim. The Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice and allowed the counterclaims to proceed.

Why is this case fun?

It’s hornbook law that a federal court doesn’t have jurisdiction to hear a case when a plaintiff files a complaint and then voluntarily amends the complaint removing the claim or claims over which the court had original jurisdiction. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 1397, 1409 (2007). And federal jurisdiction cannot rest exclusively on a counterclaim. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Circulation Systems, Inc. 535 U.S. 826 (2002). A federal court may, however, assert jurisdiction over a case where a plaintiff brings a claim over which the court has original jurisdiction, which the court later dismisses. F.R.C.P. 1367(c)(3).

For the Court in Optimal Markets v. FTI Consulting, Inc. to meet it’s obligations under 41(a)(2) (not to deprive the Defendants the opportunity to adjudicate their counterclaim) and under Rockwell (a federal court has no jurisdiction if a plaintiff amends its complaint removing all claims that would provide a basis for original jurisdiction), it had to dismiss the copyright claim, and not just allow the defendant to amend it’s complaint removing the claim. Civil procedure fun!

Commercial misappropriation, unjust enrichment, breach of non-exclusive license claims held not preempted by the Copyright Act

Shourin Sen - 22 June 2009 – 9:09 am

Filed under Preemption, Registration

Salestraq America, LLC v. Zyskowski, 2009 WL 1652146 (D. Nev. 2009)

The plaintiff compiled content about residential property in the greater Las Vegas area. The content contained information on seventeen thousand proprieties, including floor plans, measurements, architectural features, as well as general highlights about the property. The plaintiff distributed the content via a subscription website and monthly CD-ROMs.

The defendant allegedly signed up for the plaintiff’s service and then began to offer the content on a competing subscription website. The plaintiff brought claims for copyright infringement, violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and a series of state law claims including commercial misappropriation, unjust enrichment, and breach of a nonexclusive license.

Preemption of state law claims

The defendant moved to dismiss claims for commercial misappropriation, unjust enrichment, and breach of a nonexclusive license on the basis that the claims were preempted by 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). The Court cited the Ninth Circuit’s holding in G.S. Rasmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc. for the proposition that while a state law claim for improper copying is preempted, a claim for improper use of the content is not preempted:

In the present case, [The Plaintiff's] state claims allege, not only that Defendants copied the [it's content], but also that Defendants used the Murphy IP for their own commercial benefit in violation of state law. Thus, under Rasmussen, [The Plaintiff's] allegations change the nature of its state claims so that they are qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim. [The Plaintiff's] state claims are therefore not preempted by the Copyright Act.

The Court didn’t explicitly address the claim for breach of a nonexclusive license but held that it wasn’t preempted. The Court also addressed a registration and CFAA issues.

“Backwards-looking” registration

The defendant moved to dismiss the copyright claim on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction because the registration was defective. The defendant argued that plaintiff failed to comply with Section 411(a) because it had registered a 2008 version of its content, but not the 2007 version that the plaintiff alleged was infringed. The court found that the plaintiff’s registration of the 2008 derivative work satisfied the Section 411(a) for purposes of bringing suit on the 2007 version of the work because the allegedly infringed preexisting content was included in the registration.

This situation is essentially the reverse of the forward-looking registration we saw in Facebook v. PowerVentures a couple of weeks ago. Facebook registered an older version of its website but brought suit for infringement of the current version. In both backwards-looking and forwards-looking registration situations, a plaintiff’s infringement claim can only extend as broadly as the content incorporated in the registration.

Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant breached the CFAA because while it had obtained a license to access the Website, it exceeded its “authorized access by copying content from the Website and using that content for Defendants’ commercial use.” This court distinguished situations where a person misuses information that was properly accessed from situations where a person exceeds their authorized access to obtain restricted info, and granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss:

There is a crucial difference between misusing information properly accessed and exceeding one’s authorized access to obtain restricted information. This case falls into the former category, as SalesTraq acknowledges in its complaint that Defendants paid to access the content on SalesTraq’s Website. ( See id. ¶ 20); see also U.S. Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1192 (D.Kan.2009) (“[A]ccess to a protected computer occurs ‘without authorization’ only when initial access is not permitted, and a violation for ‘exceeding authorized access’ occurs only when initial access to the computer is permitted but the access of certain information is not permitted.”).

Anyone want to help with a website redesign?

Shourin Sen - 20 June 2009 – 4:52 pm

Filed under News

Dearest readers who are students, web designers, graphic artists, knowledgeable in the ways of the intertubes:

If you have any interest in redesigning the theme of this site please shoot me an email at exclusiverights [at] gmail.com. I would like the site to be usable, fun, professional, but most of all, I’d like it to not look like it was designed by a six year old who just figured out HTLM, id est my current work. I run WordPress.

I may be able to grossly, grossly underpay you with a small, small honorarium. Plus, you’d be able to claim you’ve designed THE MOST POPULAR WEBSITE IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION!!!!!!1!!!1!!-TM. I know, not exactly the most enticing proposition.

Cheers,

The Management