Category Archives: Assignment

Religious translations are works of “imagination and creativity” for purposes of a fair use evaluation

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Filed under Assignment, Fair Use, Ownership, Settlement, Transfers

Society of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory, 2010 WL 548114 (D. Mass. 2010)

A Greek Orthodox Monastery brought a copyright suit alleging that an archbishop had infringed a series of its translations of religious texts and that the Archbishop had breached a Settlement Agreement reached in a prior lawsuit involving one of the disputed works.

Ownership

The Archbishop argued that the copyright to one of the works should as a matter of church law be transferred to the Rusian Orthodox Church Outside Russia. The argument was derived from an ongoing dispute that arose when the Greek Orthodox Monastery elected to leave the ROCOR. In 1994, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the Greek Orthodox Monastary was congregational in terms of property ownership and was the sole owner of all of its assets, not the ROCOR. See, e.g., Primate and Bishops’ Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia v. Russian Orthodox Church of the Holy Resurrection, Inc., 418 Mass. 1001, 636 N.E.2d 211 (1994). The Court found that it didn’t need to re-open the dispute because there was no written transfer:

The court need not, however, accept the Archbishop’s invitation to delve into the intricacies of the doctrine of neutral principles as it applies to ecclesiastical disputes. The Copyright Act provides a simpler statutory answer. After 1978, a transfer of copyright, other than by operation of law, “is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.” 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).

As a side note, you can’t say for certain from the factual record, but this case may raise similar issues to those discussed in Schrock v. Learning Curve International, Inc., No. 08-1296 (7th Cir. 2009).  The exclusive rights granted to a work employing preexisting material covered by copyright, such as many translations,  do not extend to any part of the work in which the material was used without permission. 17 U.S.C. 103(a).

If the greek text of the disputed work contains copyrightable subject matter added by the ROCOR, such as annotations or editing choices made recent enough so that they are not in the public domain, the Monastary may, or may not, possess exclusive rights in its translation of the text. The outcome would depend on whether the Court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s finding from Schrock that when a rightsholder grants permission to a second author to make a derivative work, barring an agreement between the parties otherwise, the second author retains a copyright in the derivative work, even if the rightsholder later attempts to revoke permission.

Fair Use

The Archbishop’s copying of one of the works at issue omitted footnotes and three words, added some question marks, changed the spelling of six words, and added some headlines.  The Court found that the work was substantially similar to the Monastery’s.

The Court then looked to whether the copying was a non-infringing fair use. The Court cited Campbell v. Acuff Rose for the proposition that not only is fair use an affirmative defense, but that a defendant has a “burden of proof” to show that the copying was non-infringing. The Court found that the use of the work was infringing.

Purpose and character

The Archbishop argued that his use was non-commercial (purely for devotional purposes), which was not disputed, and that his use was transformative because he placed a portion on the internet. The Court rejected the argument finding that a “simple repackaging” of a work in a new media context is “not transformative when the result is simply a mirror image reflected on a new mirror,” and found that the factor weighed in favor of the Monastery.

Nature of the copyrighted work

The Archbishop argued that the work at issue was factual as part of his religion, and as such, the factor weighed in favor of a finding of fair use. The Court found that the work was more closely akin to a creative work:

As a theological precept, this may ring true to a believer, but from an objective legal perspective, a religious contemplation in the form of a Homily (an admonitory sermon or discourse) falls more appropriately within the category of a work of imagination and creativity. While a translation is by definition derivative, some translations-the King James Version of the Bible comes to mind-are nonetheless thought to be “original in their own right.” This factor, on the whole, weighs in favor of the Monastery.

The amount and substantiality

The Court found that the Archbishop  incorporated the entirety of one of the works on his website for “no apparent purpose other than avoiding the trouble and expense of creating a version of his own.”

Market harm

The Monastery did not allege any specific lost sales or profits as a result of the infringement. The Monastary instead noted that it has had to expend time and resources to enforce its rights in the work. The Court found that, “given Campbell’s emphasis on the deterrence of injurious conduct by others as a consideration separate and apart from a showing of actual market harm, this factor too weighs in favor of the Monastery.”

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Chain of title unclear in infringement suit over classic Marx action figures

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Filed under Assignment

American Plastic Equipment, Inc. v. Toytrackerz, LLC, 2009 WL 902422 (D. Kan. 2009)

There was an order last week that illustrates how a plaintiff must provide a written instrument to show chain of title.  Louis Marx & Co. was a toy company that, between 1964 to 1970, sold 1:6 scale action figures that it registered the copyrights for in its name. (A picture of one of the figures, Chief Cherokee, is on the left.) Louis Marx was bought by Quaker Oats; which sold the company to Dunbee-Combex; which reorganized (no one is sure how) as Dubee-Combex-Marx; which went into bankruptcy and had its assets repossessed by Chemical Bank of New York; which sold the copyrights “if any” to American Plastic Equipment, the plaintiff in this action, for ten dollars. Got it? The bill of sale contained the following language:

The Property has been repossessed by the Seller from Louis Marx & Co. or its affiliated companies in the exercise of its rights under a security agreement.

American Plastic brought a copyright infringement action against Toytracerkz, alleging that the company had infringed its copyrights in eleven of the action figures. image Magistrate Judge David J. Waxse of the District of Kansas granted Toytrackerz summary judgment finding  that the “chain of title” was unclear:

For the chain of title to be secure, Plaintiff would have to present a written document, signed by the then owner, transferring the copyrights to Chemical Bank. It is not enough that the Bills of Sale indicate that the copyrights were “repossessed by the Seller [Chemical Bank] from Louis Marx & Co. or its affiliated companies in the exercise of its rights under a security agreement.”

The decision had a nice discussion of the differences between 17 U.S.C. 204(a)’s requirement of an executed writing and the statute of frauds:

Under § 204(a) of the Copyright Act, “[a] transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.” While Section 204(a)’s signed writing requirement is sometimes called the “copyright statute of frauds,” it is in fact different from a statute of frauds.  Section 204 “is a prerequisite to a valid transfer of copyright ownership, and not merely an evidentiary rule.” A transfer of copyright is simply not valid without the required written instrument. A mere claim that a written document exists is not enough to cloud the title; the written document transferring the rights and signed by the owner must be submitted into evidence.

The writing in question “doesn’t have to be the Magna Charta; a one-line pro forma statement will do.” Nor does the writing have to contain any particular language.FN42 It must, however, clearly show an agreement to transfer the rights in the copyright.

The writing requirement serves several purposes. First, it ensures that a copyright will not be inadvertently transferred.FN44 Second, it “forces a party who wants to use the copyrighted work to negotiate with the creator to determine precisely what rights are being transferred and at what price.” Third, it provides a guide for resolving disputes; the parties can look to the writing to determine whether a use is improper.FN46 In these ways, the writing requirement “enhances predictability and certainty of copyright ownership-‘Congress’ paramount goal’ when it revised the [Copyright] Act in 1976.” [citation omitted]

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